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��ࡱ�>�� z|��y��u �r��nbjbj�n�n2l��a��a�f ��""��8�\u�|olqqqqq��n�n�n�n�n�n�n$�p��sf!o��!o��qq46o)))��q�q�n)��n)))q��io��k)�nlo0|o)�s�r�s))�/�s��k��)��!o!o�p��|o��s��"qs: journal of public administration research and theory volume 32, issue 2, april 2022 1. title: comparing systemic and individual sources of racially disparate traffic stop outcomes authors: kelsey shoub abstract: the deaths of george floyd and breonna taylor brought discussions of race and policing to the forefront in the summer of 2020 in the united states, spurring protests and calls for policing reform. however, enacting successful reforms curtailing racially biased policing requires understanding whether bias is widespread, likely tied to systemic sources, or the work of a few racist officers. this study elaborates on these perspectives by drawing on theories of systemic and individual bias that may arise when bureaucrats have ample discretion. using millions of traffic stops, i construct two measures to evaluate whether disparities are widespread�as indicated by the first perspective�or confined to a few officers�as suggested by the second. this study finds widespread racial disparities in who is searched following a traffic stop and that banning consent searches would alter policing patterns more than eliminating outlier officers in a set of paired t-tests. 2. title: administrative groupings and equality in public service provision authors: sarah yde junge abstract: scarcity in public service agencies requires a prioritization of resources, and inherent to all prioritizations is a comparison of the cases. despite the amount of research that has been conducted on the prioritization process, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the underlying comparison. drawing on insight from the street-level bureaucracy literature, this study suggests that the administrative grouping of citizens in public service agencies influences the comparison so that the allocation of public services not only depends on a citizen�s need, but also on the needs of the other citizens assigned to the same agency. in a fixed effects analysis, based on registry data on more than 300,000 students, this study exploits the as-good-as-random assignment of students to classes within schools to analyze the influence of classroom composition on referrals to special education in danish primary school. the result shows that students with better-performing peers are considerably more likely to be referred to special education than equally low-achieving students in lower-performing classes. this finding substantiates the argument of frame of reference effects in street-level bureaucracy and illustrates an unwarranted distributive consequence of the administrative grouping of citizens, thereby initiating a theoretical discussion of how such an influence can be mitigated. 3. title: community foundations as network conveners: structuring collective agency for child education and development system impact authors: donna sedgwick, robin h lemaire, jessica wirgau, lauren k mckeague abstract: the resource investment and flexibility necessary to support the development of collective agency among autonomous organizational actors can be substantial. public agencies, with their rigid budget cycles and regulatory burdens, often struggle with providing the resources needed to forge this type of system building to address complex community issues. community foundations, as anchor institutions in communities, exhibit financial and social power, flexibility, and a reputation for broad community interests that position them to be such conveners. framing our examination with structuration theory, we conducted a longitudinal mixed methods action research project from fall 2015 to spring 2019 to document how a community foundation dislodged schemas and convened a purpose-oriented network to forge collective agency. data collection included surveying 40 system providers before the launching of the network and 49 providers 3 yr later, interviews with 10 network participants, and field observations of 21 network meetings. network analysis was employed to examine the changes to the system while qualitative methods were used to analyze the processes behind those changes. the implications of this study are that emphasizing the resources and processes that contribute to building collective action broadens perspectives about which organizations may be well suited to convening networks in the public sphere. 4. title: public service motivation as a predictor of corruption, dishonesty, and altruism authors: jordan gans-morse, alexander kalgin, andrey klimenko, dmitriy vorobyev, andrei yakovlev abstract: understanding how public service motivation (psm) is tied to ethical or unethical conduct is critically important, given that civil servants and other public-sector employees throughout the world have been shown to exhibit high psm levels. however, empirical evidence about the relationship between psm and ethical or unethical behavior remains limited, due in part to the challenges of observing unethical conduct and overcoming social desirability bias in self-reported measures. we address these challenges by employing incentivized experimental games to study the relationships between psm and two types of unethical behavior�corruption and dishonesty�as well as one type of ethical behavior: altruism. based on data from approximately 1,870 university students at three research sites in russia and ukraine, we find evidence of a robust negative association between psm and willingness to engage in corruption and a positive association between psm and altruistic behavior. results concerning dishonesty are more mixed. our findings indicate that corruption and dishonesty are related yet fundamentally distinct concepts, particularly with respect to their compatibility with psm. the findings additionally demonstrate that hypotheses about psm and behavioral ethics generated in the western context generalize well to the starkly different institutional context of the former soviet union. 5. title: public-sector honesty and corruption: field evidence from 40 countries authors: raanan sulitzeanu-kenan, markus tepe, omer yair abstract: this study presents a theoretical model of honest behavior in the public sector (public-sector honesty) and its relationship with corruption. we test this model empirically by utilizing and extending a unique data set of honest behavior of public- and private-sector workers across 40 countries, gathered in a field experiment conducted by cohn et al. (n = 17,303). we find that public-sector honesty is determined by country-level societal culture and public-sector culture; public-sector honesty predicts corruption levels, independently from the effect of incentive structures�in line with the becker�stigler model. we find no support for a global mean difference in honest behavior between public- and private-sector workers, alongside substantive cross-country variation in sector differences in honest behavior. the emphasis assigned to honesty of public-sector workers within each country appears to be locally determined by the prevailing public-sector culture. these results imply that beyond cross-national variation in the scope of publicness, it is very content may vary across countries. lastly, the results of this study consistently fail to support the selection thesis, and we discuss the practical implications of this result for anticorruption policy. 6. title: political (over)representation of public sector employees and the double-motive hypothesis: evidence from norwegian register data (2007�2019) authors: benny geys, zuzana murdoch, rune j s�rensen abstract: countries have widely diverging regulations regarding the eligibility of public sector employees for political office, and the stringency of such regulations remains fiercely debated. building on a demand and supply model of political selection, this article contributes to such debates by studying whether and how the incentives of public employees as both consumers and producers of public services (their �double motive�) affects their descriptive political representation. our analysis employs population-wide individual-level register data covering four norwegian local elections between 2007 and 2019 (n > 13 million observations). using predominantly individual-level panel regression models, we find that public employees are strongly overrepresented on election lists and have a higher probability of election (conditional on running). looking at underlying mechanisms, we provide evidence consistent with the �double motive� of public employees inducing their self-selection into standing for elected office (at higher-ranked ballot positions). demand-side effects deriving from party and voter selection receive more limited empirical support. we discuss ensuing concerns about the potential substantive representation of policy self-interests by elected public employees. 7. title: bureaucratic control and strategic compliance: how do subnational governments implement central guidelines in china? authors: shiyang xiao, xufeng zhu abstract: bureaucratic control, the constraint that a superior imposes on subordinate agencies� discretion through guidelines, is ubiquitous in administrative organizations. despite scholarly discussions on the merits and shortcomings of bureaucratic control, we still know little about the impact of the extents of bureaucratic control on subordinates� compliance patterns. in this article, we argue that bureaucratic control might intensify subordinates� burdens and incentivize them to strategically reduce compliance with the central guidelines that impose such control on them. we build a database containing 42 social regulatory guidelines issued by the chinese state council (central government) and 848 implementation documents issued by provincial governments between 2003 and 2012. as bureaucratic control in a central guideline increases, provincial governments might postpone the release or withhold the implementation documents and reiterate less content of the corresponding central guideline. interestingly, when provincial governments lack financial resources, the aforementioned reactions to bureaucratic control is weakened and even reversed to be positive. moreover, central mobilization alleviates the negative impact of bureaucratic control on the surface but might fail to address subordinates� decrease of compliance in hidden ways. central monitoring raises the overall level of subordinates� compliance but does not moderate how subordinates circumvent central guidelines with high degree of control. 8. title: meta-analysis of collaboration and performance: moderating tests of sectoral differences in collaborative performance authors: david lee, chiako hung abstract: over the past few decades, collaboration has flourished in the public administration and policy fields as a rational means to solve complex issues and improve public service performance. through a meta-analysis of 26 studies with 251 effect sizes, this investigation provides novel perspectives for understanding the effects of different collaborative partnerships on performance. to test these mechanisms, we applied various social science theories, such as institutional theory, resource dependence theory, a resource-based view, and transaction cost theories. our findings indicate that the overall effect of collaborative performance is positive and significant. moreover, meta-regression results show that public�public collaboration results in better performance than public�nonprofit or public�business collaboration, while involving all three entity types in collaborative efforts yields similar outcomes to public�public collaboration. several implications of these findings are outlined for researchers and practitioners. 9. title: moderating diversity, collective commitment, and discrimination: the role of ethical leaders in the public sector authors: kuk-kyoung moon, robert k christensen abstract: despite public administration�s growing interest in personnel diversity and ethical leadership, little is known about the effectiveness of ethical leadership in managing diverse public workforces. can ethical leadership moderate the relationships between demographic diversity and key organizational outcomes? to answer, we synthesize four theories about demographic diversity, ethical leadership, and inclusion: social categorization theory, social exchange theory, social learning theory, and optimal distinctiveness theory. these theories illuminate the interrelationships between diversity, ethical leadership, and two types of collective organizational outcomes: affective commitment climate and race-based employment discrimination. using panel data from the us federal government, feasible generalized least squares models indicate that racial diversity is negatively related to affective commitment climate and positively related to race-based employment discrimination. the results also show that ethical leadership beneficially moderates the associations of racial diversity with the two organizational outcomes. these findings suggest that ethical leadership aids public managers and personnel in racially diverse public agencies. 10. title: competition, ownership, and the impact of government outsourcing on employees authors: ole helby petersen, lotte b�gh andersen, yosef bhatti, kurt houlberg abstract: government outsourcing to third-party vendors is widespread and intended to strengthen the organizational incentive to deliver public services more efficiently. however, it is unclear how outsourcing influences the public workforce, and little is known about the effect on employees who change from working for the government to working for the vendor receiving the outsourcing contract. in this article, we theoretically argue that the introduction of competition and private ownership in public service delivery may have negative consequences for employees� remuneration, employment, and health outcomes. we assess these arguments using unique individual-level register data of 1,478 danish relatively low-skilled employees who changed job from public to private employment due to government outsourcing. using a difference-in-difference (did) approach, we estimate the effect on employees� remuneration, employment and income transfers, and use of health services compared to an exact matched control group of public employees who did not experience outsourcing. our findings suggest that outsourcing significantly decreased employee remuneration and employment and increased public income transfers, while the effect on health services use was marginal and transitory. potential mechanisms explaining these findings include the vendor�s incentive to reduce the workforce and increase productivity, the stress of changing jobs, and poorer person�environment fit. the results suggest that outsourcing has high costs for employees, some of which are passed on to the government itself through increased expenditure for public income transfers. we propose pathways for further theoretical and empirical research on employee consequences of government outsourcing. 11. title: exit, voice, and sabotage: public service motivation and guerrilla bureaucracy in times of unprincipled political principals authors: christian schuster, kim sass mikkelsen, izabela correa, jan-hinrik meyer-sahling abstract: democratic backsliding has multiplied �unprincipled� political principals: governments with weak commitment to the public interest. why do some bureaucrats engage in voice and guerrilla sabotage to thwart policies against the public interest under �unprincipled principals,� yet others do not? despite its centrality in contemporary governance, this conundrum has not seen quantitative research. we address this gap with survey evidence from 1,700 brazilian public servants during the temer presidency, widely perceived to lack democratic legitimacy and integrity. we focus on one key explanator: public service motivation (psm). we argue that bureaucrats with greater psm are more likely to engage in voice and sabotage of �unprincipled policies,� and exit to avoid implementing �unprincipled policies.� structural equation models support these hypotheses. public service-motivated bureaucracies are thus short-run stalwarts against �unprincipled� political principals. over time, they look to depart, however, leaving �unprincipled� principals a freer hand to pursue policies against the public interest. 12. title: managing diversity differently: the external environment and cross-sector differences in diversity management authors: austin m mccrea, ling zhu, morgen s johansen abstract: a growing literature identifies the external environment as a key driver of diversity management in frontline public services. with many public services spanning the public, nonprofit, and private sectors, the degree to which ownership moderates the link between the environment and diversity management practice is an important area that has received little attention. using longitudinal data on nearly 4,000 american hospitals from 2008 to 2012, we explore how public, nonprofit, and private hospitals diverge in their responses to three environmental factors�market competition, inter-organizational collaboration, and the racial diversity of the population in their local service area. findings from random effects panel models and panel logistic regressions suggest that these factors are associated with heterogeneous diversity management activities across different sectors. for public hospitals, diversity management is influenced by the racial diversity of clients. nonprofit hospitals� diversity management is influenced by both inter-organizational collaboration and the racial diversity of clients. market competition is the main driver of diversity management in the private sector. these findings bring insights from contingency theory and the cross-sector comparison literature into diversity management research. key findings suggest there are complex and multiple mechanisms guiding diversity management practices across different sectors. 45<=>fginqstuw_`��ʹ�ʪʘ�zf^qc<.hka!hka!5�ojqj^jhka!hka!h�"�hu<�5�ojqj^jh�ud5�ojqj^jo(h�"�h�"�o(&h�"�h�"�5�cjojqj^jajo(h58�5�cjojqj^jajh 2e5�cjojqj^jaj#hka!hka!5�cjojqj^jajhka!5�cjojqj^jaj hka!5�cjojqj^jajo(#h�"�h�"�5�cjojqj^jaj h$-�5�cjojqj^jajo(#hka!hka!5�cjojqj^jaj5tuv�� _��t�56��$�$��gd�psgd)w�gd$?�gdto�gd�l$gd%j,gdu<�gd�"�$a$gdt4�� ķ�ݪ��v�h��vxh��vxhݪhvi�h�l$5�ojqj^jo(h�l$h�l$5�ojqj^jh�l$5�ojqj^jo(hj�5�ojqjo(hka!ht4ojqj^jo(hka!hj�ojqj^jo(hka!hka!ojqj^jht45�ojqj^jo(hicy5�ojqj^jhka!hka!5�ojqj^jhka!hka!hj�5�ojqj^jo(h�"�hu<�5�ojqj^j��]^_hi��˽��˃��˃��vh[�n@h�"�h%j,5�ojqj^jhs/�5�ojqj^jo(hihanojqj^jhc�hto�ojqj^jo(hc�hc�ojqj^jhvi�hto�5�ojqj^jo(hc�hc�5�ojqj^jhc�hc�hto�hto�5�ojqj^jhto�hto�h�"�h�`�5�ojqj^jhto�5�ojqj^jo(h%j,5�ojqjo(hihu<�ojqj^jo(hka!h�l$ojqj^jo(�rst\]��345679?@��ͽ��ͽ�겤��~pb[m~?bhvi�h�ps5�ojqj^jh��h��5�ojqj^jh��h��h�psh�ps5�ojqj^jh�"�h)w�5�ojqj^jh�ps5�ojqj^jo(h)w�5�ojqjo(hvi�h%j,ojqj^jo(h�)h$?�ojqj^jo(h�f�h�f�ojqj^jhvi�h$?�5�ojqj^jo(h$?�5�ojqj^jo(h�f�h�f�5�ojqj^jh�f�h�f�h$?�h$?�5�ojqj^j��$�$�$�$�$�$�$�$[%\%]%e%f%�%��qc\n@c\nhvi�hr7a5�ojqj^jhzhz5�ojqj^jhzhzhr7ahr7a5�ojqj^jh�"�h)w�5�ojqj^jhr7a5�ojqj^jo(h)w�5�ojqjo(hvi�h)w�ojqj^jo(h��h)w�ojqj^jo(h��h��ojqj^jh$?�h)w�5�ojqj^jhvi�h)w�5�ojqj^jo(h�ps5�ojqj^jo(h��h��5�ojqj^jh��h��$]%�%�*�*# f =1>1�1�1�5�5q6�6�;�;�;0<c c�cdbhch�h��gd�s�gd�_gdlz�gd�)ggd|�gd)w�gdr7a�%�%�%�%�%�*�*�*�*�*�*�*�*! 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