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���������������������8<v�7kljjjjj����j�j�j�j�j�j�j$�l�eo:�j�������j��jj4�j�����j�j�j���j���j���� ˙���r��jk07k�o�fo���/o�^hd���������j�j<l���7k������������������������������������������������������������������������o�����������: journal of public administration research and theory
volume 22, issue 2, april 2012
1. title: policy divergence in implementation: how conflict among decisive legislators reinforces the effect of agency preferences
authors: annemarije oosterwaal; ren� torenvlied
abstract: the question whether political conflict affects the course and outcomes of policy implementation is debated among scholars in public administration. whereas some scholars emphasize the mediating effects of procedures for political control of bureaucracy, other scholars highlight the actions and preferences of agencies. the present study combines both perspectives and argues that policy divergence is explained by political conflict in interaction with agency preferences. political conflict is specified in conjunction with the decision-making context. conflict among decisive legislators�rather than the legislature as a whole�is hypothesized to reinforce the effect of agency preferences on policy divergence. using a cross-classified multilevel design, data on local policy making and implementation in the netherlands offer support for these hypotheses and reveal that preferences of agencies and conflict among decisive legislators should be included in explanations for policy divergences in the implementation process.
2. title: the consequences of presidential patronage for federal agency performance
authors: nick gallo; david e. lewis
abstract: in this article, we examine the relationship between presidential patronage and federal agency performance. using program assessment rating tool (part) management scores for 1,016 federal programs during the bush administration, we compare the performance of federal programs administered by appointees from the campaign or party against programs run by other appointees or career professionals. we introduce new means of overcoming the shortcomings of part scores in order to make reliable inferences from this measure of federal program performance. we find that federal programs administered by appointees from the campaign or party earn lower part scores than programs run by other appointees or by career executives. we conclude that although appointing persons from the campaign or party provides presidents an important source of political capital and arguably improves accountability, it also has costs for agency performance.
3. title: evidence-based practice and the use of information in state agency decision making
authors: edward t. jennings; jeremy l. hall
abstract: the contemporary policy environment makes persistent demands on agency officials to use the best information available when making decisions about policies, programs, and practices. state and federal legislation calls on agencies to incorporate evidence-based practices (ebp) in their programs. using data from a 2008 survey of state agency directors, we examine the extent to which state government agencies draw upon various sources of information to guide their decisions about programmatic operations. our findings reveal the extent to which agencies rely on, or weight, sources of scientific studies and formal evaluations compared to other sources. factor analysis identifies patterns of agency information use, providing a basis for further exploring agency differences in information consultation that underlie development of new policies and programs in the vein of ebp.
4. title: public participation and organizational performance: evidence from state agencies
authors: milena i. neshkova; hai (david) guo
abstract: public participation in administrative decision making has been widely advocated by both theorists and practitioners of public administration. despite the importance of citizen engagement, we know little about its impact on the performance of government agencies. is participation only normatively desirable or does it have some practical value attached to it? we draw on data from u.s. state transportation agencies to test the relevance of two theoretical perspectives about the effect of public participation on organizational performance. the traditional perspective holds that there is a trade-off between democratic and administrative decision making. a competing perspective suggests that citizen input provides administrators with valuable site-specific information and contributes to more efficient and effective public programs. we find strong support for the latter perspective. our results show that there is not necessarily a trade-off between the values of democracy and bureaucracy, with clear implications for the theory and practice of democratic governance.
5. title: contracting or public delivery? the importance of service, market, and management characteristics
authors: amir hefetz andmildred e. warner
abstract: analysis of local government contracting decisions typically focuses on transactions costs related to service characteristics, especially asset specificity and difficulty of contract management. this analysis expands the focus to include market characteristics (competition), citizen characteristics (public interest in the service delivery process), and place characteristics (metro status and public management) and finds these are the more important factors. a 2007 survey of us city managers� rankings of 67 services by transactions costs, competition, and citizen interest is combined with a 2007 national survey of city managers� sourcing decisions (direct public, intergovernment cooperation, for-profit and nonprofit contracting). multinomial logit models of service delivery sourcing choice find that metro status and competition are key explanatory variables. intergovernmental cooperation represents an important public market alternative when contract management is difficult and competition is low. for profit contracting is less common when citizen interest is high and competition is low. governments with professional managers appear more effective in addressing these broader transactions costs of citizen interests, political and labor opposition, and market management.
6. title: treating policy brokers seriously: evidence from the climate policy
authors: karin ingold andfr�d�ric varone
abstract: the advocacy coalition framework (acf) pays special attention to �so-called� policy brokers when explaining policy change. however, this prominent policy approach neither clearly defines who the policy brokers are nor identifies under which institutional rules they have an influence on policy processes and outputs. this article thus formulates two theoretical hypotheses that complement the acf and then proceeds to undertake the first empirical testing of these hypotheses within the swiss climate policy (1990�2008). the empirical results show that, in the case under investigation, the strategic interest-based behavior of two policy brokers (i.e., one public administration and one political party), as well as two institutionalized veto points (i.e., optional referendum and parliamentary committee), are crucial factors explaining policy brokers' influence on policy process and change.
7. title: bureaucratic effectiveness and influence in the legislature
authors: jill nicholson-crotty andsusan m. mille
abstract: an extensive literature explores the correlates of bureaucratic influence in the implementation of public policy. considerably less work, however, has investigated the conditions under which bureaucratic actors influence legislative outcomes. in this article, we develop the argument that effectiveness should be a key determinant of bureaucratic influence in the legislative process and identify a set of institutional characteristics that may facilitate or constrain this relationship. we test these expectations in an analysis of legislator perceptions of bureaucratic influence over legislative outcomes in the 50 us states. the results suggest that the impact of bureaucratic effectiveness on the influence of the bureaucracy over legislative outcomes is greater in states with legislative term limits, united governments, and fragmented executive branches.
8. title: the politics of ex parte lobbying: pre-proposal agenda building and blocking during agency rulemaking
authors: susan webb yackee
abstract: scholars generally agree that interest groups are active and at times influential during the notice and comment period of regulatory policymaking (or �rulemaking�). but current research often ignores the agenda setting that may take place during the pre-proposal stage of rulemaking. during proposal development, interest groups may lobby to: (1) influence the content of proposed regulations or (2) block items from the regulatory agenda altogether. this article focuses on ex parte lobbying��off the public record� conversations in which lobbyists share policy and political information with regulators�during the pre-proposal stage of rulemaking. i assess the importance of ex parte influence with data from a content analysis of government documents drawn from seven federal government agencies and a telephone survey of interested parties. overall, the findings provide the first empirical confirmation that �off the record� lobbying can, and at times, does matter to regulatory content changes during a stage of the american policymaking process that is often overlooked by scholars and the public: the pre-proposal stage of agency rulemaking.
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