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��ࡱ�>�� ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� �r��bbjbj�v�v2��<�<�z �������ooooo����ccc8��/$cxo4s�����3*]q �n�n�n�n�n�n�n$�p�ns@oo}33}}ooo��42o]]]}�o�o��n]}�n]]]����� ^���ckr]�nho0xo]�s�:�s]]n/�so�l8}}]}}}}}oo�f}}}xo}}}}���������������������������������������������������������������������s}}}}}}}}} : the american economic review  hyperlink "javascript:xslpostback('ctl00$ctl00$maincontentarea$maincontentarea$volissuectrl$xsldisplay','issuelink','linkterm|jn "american economic review" and dt 20110401');" \o "vol. 101 issue 2 - apr2011" volume 101, issue 2, apr. 2011 1. title:  hyperlink "http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/viewarticle?data=dgjymppp44rp2/dv0+njisfk5ie46bnmrqq0ubok63nn5kx95uxxjl6rrumupbbir6eetbiptfkyqp5zy5zyit/k8xnh6ueh7n/ivauurkyvrbnir66khn/k5vxj5kr84lpgjeac8nnls79mpnfsvbovt0uuqrbopnztiuvx8lxk6+qe8tv2jaaa&hid=25" \o "the american economic association." the american economic association authors:  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "hall, robert e"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for hall, robert e" hall, robert e abstract: in a market-clearing economy, declines in demand from one sector do not cause large declines in aggregate output because other sectors expand. the key price mediating the response is the interest rate. a decline in the rate stimulates all categories of spending. but in a low-inflation economy, the room for a decline in the rate is small, because of the notorious lower limit of zero on the nominal interest rate. in the great depression, substantial deflation caused the real interest rate to reach high levels. in the great slump that began at the end of 2007, low inflation resulted in an only slightly negative real rate when full employment called for a much lower real rate because of declines in demand. fortunately, the inflation rate hardly responded to conditions in product and labor markets, else deflation might have occurred, with an even higher real interest rate. i concentrate on three closely related sources of declines in demand: the buildup of excess stocks of housing and consumer durables, the corresponding expansion of consumer debt that financed the buildup, and financial frictions that resulted from the decline in real-estate prices. 2. title: reference points and effort provision authors:  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "abeler, johannes"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for abeler, johannes" abeler, johannes;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "falk, armin"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for falk, armin" falk, armin;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "goette, lorenz"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for goette, lorenz" goette, lorenz;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "huffman, david"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for huffman, david" huffman, david abstract: a key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is: what determines the reference point?? one candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. in a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision. we find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation-based, reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low. 3. title: contracts as reference points--experimental evidence authors:  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "fehr, ernst"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for fehr, ernst" fehr, ernst;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "hart, oliver"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for hart, oliver" hart, oliver;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "zehnder, christian"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for zehnder, christian" zehnder, christian abstract: hart and john moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long-term contracts and the employment relation. we examine experimentally their idea that contracts serve as reference points. the evidence confirms the prediction that there is a trade-off between rigidity and flexibility. flexible contracts--which would dominate rigid contracts under standard assumptions--cause significant shading in ex post performance, while under rigid contracts much less shading occurs. the experiment appears to reveal a new behavioral force: ex ante competition legitimizes the terms of a contract, and aggrievement and shading occur mainly about outcomes within the contract. 4. title: the economics of credence goods: an experiment on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation, and competition authors:  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "dulleck, uwe"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for dulleck, uwe" dulleck, uwe;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "kerschbamer, rudolf"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for kerschbamer, rudolf" kerschbamer, rudolf;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "sutter, matthias"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for sutter, matthias" sutter, matthias abstract: credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market breakdown. we study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. while theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. 5. title: performance pay and multidimensional sorting: productivity, preferences, and gender authors:  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "dohmen, thomas"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for dohmen, thomas" dohmen, thomas;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "falk, armin"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for falk, armin" falk, armin abstract: this paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. subjects face the choice between a fixed and a variable payment scheme. depending on the treatment, the variable payment is a piece rate, a tournament, or a revenue-sharing scheme. we find that output is higher in the variable-payment schemes compared to the fixed-payment scheme. this difference is largely driven by productivity sorting. in addition, different incentive schemes systematically attract individuals with different attitudes, such as willingness to take risks and relative self-assessment as well as gender, which underlines the importance of multidimensional sorting. 6. title: are risk preferences stable across contexts?? evidence from insurance data authors:  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "barseghyan, levon"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for barseghyan, levon" barseghyan, levon;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "prince, jeffrey"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for prince, jeffrey" prince, jeffrey;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "teitelbaum, joshua c"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for teitelbaum, joshua c" teitelbaum, joshua c abstract: using a unique dataset, we test whether households' deductible choices in auto and home insurance reflect stable risk preferences. our test relies on a structural model that assumes households are objective expected utility maximizers and claims are generated by household-coverage specific poisson processes. we find that the hypothesis of stable risk preferences is rejected by the data. our analysis suggests that many households exhibit greater risk aversion in their home deductible choices than their auto deductible choices. our results are robust to several alternative modeling assumptions. 7. title: collaborating authors:  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "bonatti, alessandro"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for bonatti, alessandro" bonatti, alessandro;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "h��rner, johannes"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for h��rner, johannes" h��rner, johannes abstract: this paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. agents are collectively engaged in a project whose duration and outcome are uncertain, and their individual efforts are unobserved. free-riding leads not only to a reduction in effort, but also to procrastination. collaboration among agents dwindles over time, but does not cease as long as the project has not succeeded. in addition, the delay until the project succeeds, if it ever does, increases with the number of agents. we show why deadlines, but not necessarily better monitoring, help to mitigate moral hazard. 8. title: heterogeneity in risky choice behavior in a broad population authors:  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "von gaudecker, hans-martin"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for von gaudecker, hans-martin" von gaudecker, hans-martin;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "van soest, arthur"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for van soest, arthur" van soest, arthur;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "wengstr��m, erik"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for wengstr��m, erik" wengstr��m, erik abstract: we analyze risk preferences using an experiment with real incentives in a representative sample of 1,422 dutch respondents. our econometric model incorporates four structural parameters that vary with observed and unobserved characteristics: utility curvature, loss aversion, preferences toward the timing of uncertainty resolution, and the propensity to choose randomly rather than on the basis of preferences. we find that all four parameters contribute to explaining choice behavior. the structural parameters are significantly associated with socioeconomic variables, but it is essential to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in each of them to match the rich variety of choice patterns in the data. 9. title: the rich domain of uncertainty: source functions and their experimental implementation authors:  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "abdellaoui, mohammed"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for abdellaoui, mohammed" abdellaoui, mohammed;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "baillon, aur��lien"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for baillon, aur��lien" baillon, aur��lien;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "placido, laetitia"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for placido, laetitia" placido, laetitia;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "wakker, peter p"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for wakker, peter p" wakker, peter p abstract: we often deal with uncertain events for which no probabilities are known. several normative models have been proposed. descriptive studies have usually been qualitative, or they estimated ambiguity aversion through one single number. this paper introduces the source method, a tractable method for quantitatively analyzing uncertainty empirically. the theoretical key is the distinction between different sources of uncertainty, within which subjective (choice-based) probabilities can still be defined. source functions convert those subjective probabilities into willingness to bet. we apply our method in an experiment, where we do not commit to particular ambiguity attitudes but let the data speak. 10. title: procedural analysis of choice rules with applications to bounded rationality authors:  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "salant, yuval"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for salant, yuval" salant, yuval abstract: i study how limited abilities to process information affect choice behavior. i model the decision-making process by an automaton, and measure the complexity of a specific choice rule by the minimal number of states an automaton implementing the rule uses to process information. i establish that any choice rule that is less complicated than utility maximization displays framing effects. i then prove that choice rules that result from an optimal trade-off between maximizing utility and minimizing complexity are history-dependent satisficing procedures that display primacy and recency effects. 11. title: the bidder's curse authors:  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "malmendier, ulrike"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for malmendier, ulrike" malmendier, ulrike;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "lee, young han"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for lee, young han" lee, young han abstract: we employ a novel approach to identify overbidding in auctions. we compare online auction prices to fixed prices for the same item on the same webpage. in detailed data on auctions of a board game, 42 percent of auctions exceed the simultaneous fixed price. the result replicates in a broad cross-section of auctions (48 percent overbidding). a small fraction of overbidders, 17 percent of bidders, suffices to generate the large fraction of auctions with overbidding. we show that the observed behavior is inconsistent with rational behavior, even allowing for uncertainty about prices and switching costs, since the expected auction price also exceeds the fixed price. limited attention best explains our results. 12. title: falsifiability authors:  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "olszewski, wojciech"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for olszewski, wojciech" olszewski, wojciech;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "sandroni, alvaro"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for sandroni, alvaro" sandroni, alvaro abstract: we examine popper's falsifiability within an economic model in which a tester hires a potential expert to produce a theory. payments are contingent on the performance of the theory vis-�-vis data. we show that if experts are strategic, falsifiability has no power to distinguish scientific theories from worthless theories. the failure of falsification in screening informed and uninformed experts motivates questions on the broader concepts of refutation and verification. we demonstrate an asymmetry between the two concepts. like falsification, verification contracts have no power to distinguish between informed and uninformed experts, but some refutation contracts are capable of screening experts. 13. title: deferred compensation in multiperiod labor contracts: an experimental test of lazear's model authors:  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "huck, steffen"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for huck, steffen" huck, steffen;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "seltzer, andrew j"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for seltzer, andrew j" seltzer, andrew j;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "wallace, brian"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for wallace, brian" wallace, brian abstract: this paper provides the first experimental test of edward lazear's (1979) model of deferred compensation. we examine the relation ship between firms' wage offers and workers' effort supply in a multi-period environment. if firms can ex ante commit to a wage schedule with deferred compensation, workers should respond by supplying sufficient effort to avoid dismissal. we contrast this full-commitment case to controls with no commitment and computer-generated wages in order to examine the roles of monetary incentives, social preferences, and reciprocity. finally, we examine a setup without formal commitment, but where firms can build a reputation for paying deferred wages. 14. title: sales and monetary policy authors:  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "guimaraes, bernardo"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for guimaraes, bernardo" guimaraes, bernardo;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "sheedy, kevin d"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for sheedy, kevin d" sheedy, kevin d abstract: a striking fact about pricing is the prevalence of ''sales'': large temporary price cuts followed by prices returning to exactly their former levels. this paper builds a macroeconomic model with a rationale for sales based on firms facing customers with different price sensitivities. even if firms can adjust sales without cost, monetary policy has large real effects owing to sales being strategic substitutes: a firm's incentive to have a sale is decreasing in the number of other firms having sales. thus the flexibility seen in individual prices due to sales does not translate into flexibility of the aggregate price level. 15. title: the cyclical behavior of debt and equity finance authors:  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "covas, francisco"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for covas, francisco" covas, francisco;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "haan, wouter j. den"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for haan, wouter j. den" haan, wouter j. den abstract: debt and equity issuance are procyclical for most size-sorted firm categories of listed us firms and the procyclicality of equity issuance decreases monotonically with firm size. at the aggregate level, however, the results for equity issuance are not conclusive due to different behavior of the largest firms, especially those in the top one percent. during a deterioration in economic conditions, firms limit the impact of the reduction in external financing on investment by shedding financial assets. this is true for a worsening in aggregate as well as firm-specific conditions. 16. title: search dynamics in consumer choice under time pressure: an eye-tracking study. authors:  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "reutskaja, elena"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for reutskaja, elena" reutskaja, elena;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "nagel, rosemarie"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for nagel, rosemarie" nagel, rosemarie;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "camerer, colin f"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for camerer, colin f" camerer, colin f;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "rangel, antonio"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for rangel, antonio" rangel, antonio abstract: we study decisions that involve choosing between different numbers of options under time pressure using eye-tracking to monitor the search process of the subjects. we find that subjects are quite adept at optimizing within the set of items that they see, that the initial search process is random in value, that subjects use a stopping rule to terminate the search process that combines features of optimal search and satisficing, and that subjects search more often in certain focal regions of the display, which leads to choice biases. 17. title: coordination in the presence of asset markets authors:  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "kogan, shimon"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for kogan, shimon" kogan, shimon;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "kwasnica, anthony m"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for kwasnica, anthony m" kwasnica, anthony m;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "weber, roberto a"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for weber, roberto a" weber, roberto a abstract: we explore the relationship between outcomes in a coordination game and a pre-play asset market where asset values are determined by outcomes in the subsequent coordination game. across two experiments, we vary the payoffs from the market relative to the game, the degree of interdependence in the game, and whether traders' asset payoffs are dependent on outcomes in their own or another game. markets lead to significantly lower efficiency across treatments, even when they produce no distortion of incentives in the game. market prices forecast game outcomes. our experiments shed light on how financial markets may influence affiliated economic outcomes. 18. title: real-time search in the laboratory and the market authors:  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "brown, meta"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for brown, meta" brown, meta;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "flinn, christopher j"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for flinn, christopher j" flinn, christopher j;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "schotter, andrew"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for schotter, andrew" schotter, andrew abstract: while widely accepted labor market search models imply a constant reservation wage policy, empirical evidence strongly suggests that reservation wages decline in search duration. this paper reports the results of the first real-time-search laboratory experiment. the controlled environment subjects face is stationary, and the payoff-maximizing reservation wage is constant. nevertheless, subjects' reservation wages decline sharply over time. we investigate two hypotheses to explain this decline: 1. searchers respond to the stock of accruing search costs. 2. searchers experience non-stationary subjective costs of time spent searching. our data support the latter hypothesis, and we substantiate this conclusion both experimentally and econometrically. 19. title: checkmate: exploring backward induction among chess players authors:  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "levitt, steven d"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for levitt, steven d" levitt, steven d;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "list, john a"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for list, john a" list, john a;  hyperlink "javascript:__dolinkpostback('','ss~~ar "sadoff, sally e"||sl~~rl','');" \o "search for sadoff, sally e" sadoff, sally e abstract: although backward induction is a cornerstone of game theory, most laboratory experiments have found that agents are not able to successfully backward induct. we analyze the play of world-class chess players in the centipede game, which is ill-suited for testing backward induction, and in pure backward induction games--race to 100 games. we find that chess players almost never play the backward induction equilibrium in the centipede game, but many properly backward induct in the race to 100 games. we find no systematic within-subject relationship between choices in the centipede game and performance in pure backward induction games.     �           ! 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