-z6尊龙app官方网站

��ࡱ�>�� u �r�~�bjbj�n�n2��a��a�i ��""��8�d]$��t4��uswswswswswsws$*v��xf{s5��{s��4�t___��us_�us___��p��_as�t0�t_&y�rfy__�2&yby$�%p��_��{s{s#<��t��fy��"qs: governance volume 35, issue 4, october 2022 1. title: bringing political science back into public administration research authors: b. guy peters, jon pierre, eva s�rensen, jacob torfing abstract: the paper critically reviews the consequences of a bifurcation of political science and public administration. this divorce of two closely related academic fields has removed political explanations to key developments in the public service from public administration research and thus it tends to provide a partial view of the reality that it seeks to capture. there are several developments underway in the public sector, which underscore the political nature of public administration. these developments include the rise of administration politics; a growing emphasis on strategic management; governance-driven democratization and administrative micro-politics; the increasing significance of interactive and collaborative forms of governance; the rise of multilevel governance; and the development toward a more active citizenship. we find that in all of these areas, public administration research would benefit from incorporating a political science understanding of power, democracy, governance and citizenship. 2. title: public administration and political science: can this marriage be saved? authors: donald f. kettl abstract: there is a profound irony in how public administration and political science splintered at the very pinnacle of their interconnection, intellectual power, and practical impact. much of public administration has gradually separated from political science. then public administration broke into pieces, with public administration and public management going in different directions. the central question is this: are these tensions the product of diverging intellectual trends, or of fundamental organizational changes in higher education? b. guy peters, jon pierre, eva sorensen, and jacob torfing argue that political science and public administration have reached a �bifurcation� that is nothing less than a �divorce.� as i note in this paper, the wedges in this division are deep, and the basic theoretical and practical challenges are forcing it wider. it is time to ask: can this marriage be saved? is this a marriage that should be allowed to wither away? if the divorce becomes final, what might we lose in the split? 3. title: between a rock and a hard place: (re)integrating public administration and political science authors: tina nabatchi abstract: political science grew from public administration, with a particular focus on government's role in transforming policy into results" while public administration "grew with a keen focus on governmental effectiveness, from a foundation of government reform." should public administration scholars start "bringing political science back into public administration research"? in the 1970s, vincent ostrom (1973) asserted that the field of public administration was facing an intellectual crisis, which was a function of its failure to move from a theory of bureaucratic administration to a theory of democratic administration. 4. title: public administration and political science: from monogamous marriage to professional partnership authors: lotte b�gh andersen abstract: there are many compelling reasons for bringing insights from political science (ps) into public administration (pa) and vice versa (peters et al., 2022). the field of public administration before we dive into the relation between pa and ps, it is relevant to consider briefly what pa is about, where it comes from, and what its ambitions are. the way forward for the relationship between pa and ps given current developments in the literature, what are the prospects for greater mutual engagement between pa and ps scholarship? in general, pa scholars collaborate widely with public organizations, and hustedt et al. (2020, p. 131, see also bauer, 2018) find that pa is more linked to government practice than ps is. 5. title: government information disclosure and citizen coproduction during covid 19 in china authors: yiping wu, hanyu xiao, fang yang abstract: while information campaigns have been widely recognized as a pillar of public health crisis management and heightened by the current covid 19 pandemic, an insufficient number of studies have investigated the impact of information disclosure on influencing citizen cooperation crucial for emergency management. focusing on generic information disclosure practices during the recovery period from january 19, 2020, to february 29, 2020, in china and by employing a difference in difference method, this study finds that information disclosure significantly enhanced citizen coproduction as measured by aggregated search queries of covid 19 related information, and earlier disclosure yielded greater effect more quickly. moreover, government capacity and citizens' trust in government at the local level significantly moderate the positive impact of information disclosure. this study uncovers the novel relationship between information disclosure and citizen coproduction during emergencies in the chinese context. 6. title: breaking the mold? ministerial rotations, legislative production and political strategies in lebanon authors: mounir mahmalat, sami zoughaib abstract: this article investigates the effect of ministerial rotations on legislative output. we leverage a novel dataset on "significant" legislation in lebanon, defined as those texts that introduce changes in the legislative environment and are potentially relevant for legal appeals. we associate the legislative output of nine key ministries in all governments between 2005 and 2020 to 72 ministerial changes in this period. we find that rotation decreases the output of significant legislation by almost a fourth of average productivity�or more than 0.75 texts�per ministry and term, a result that is robust to various model specifications and fixed effects. leveraging 35 expert interviews with senior government officials and (ex )ministers, we provide a theory in which rotations give rise to "memory losses" within ministries depending on the strategies of political parties to penetrate institutions with loyalists. our findings have important implications for priorities to reform public administrations. 7. title: civil servants' preferences for nonprofit contractors: a conjoint analysis authors: youlang zhang, zijie shao abstract: although governments frequently contract nonprofit organizations (npos) to provide public services, little is known about why civil servants are more willing to direct funding to some npos than to others. based on previous research on government funding for npos, this study proposes a theoretical framework that combines npos' internal and external management strategies to explain civil servants' preferences for funding specific npos. on the basis of an original conjoint experiment of 1206 civil servants from china between 2020 and 2021, the analysis found that civil servants generally value the characteristics of rationalization, professionalization, collaboration, cooptation, and a prior history of receiving funding from the government in npos. a series of robustness checks were used to validate the theorized relationships. these findings have important implications for both future research and efforts to promote government�npo contracting. 8. title: how democratic is government really? the impact of subnational regime variation on evaluations of democracy authors: amanda fidalgo abstract: democracy is not an exclusively national concept, and subnational governments vary in respect for democratic norms and institutions. in subnational authoritarian enclaves, incumbents manipulate elections using fraud, corruption, institutional manipulation, or repression to maintain power. while we know a fair amount about how these authoritarian enclaves form and democratize, we know much less about how they affect the people that live in them. does subnational democracy influence evaluations of democratic performance? i argue that individuals incorporate subnational outcomes into overall evaluations of democracy, and that subnational democracy positively influences these evaluations. to test this argument, i combine a new measure of subnational democracy, the subnational electoral democracy scale, with the fifth and sixth waves of the world values survey. i find that people living in states with high electoral democracy scores are likely to believe that elections are not manipulated, human rights are protected, and that their country is democratic. 9. title: help your neighbor, help yourself: the drivers of european union's climate cooperation in trans governmental networks with its neighbors authors: karina shyrokykh abstract: climate change mitigation and adaptation are among the policy areas covered by the european union (eu) in trans governmental cooperation with the neighboring countries. although this cooperation is open to all european neighborhood policy countries and russia, there is significant cross country variance. this article maps the eu's climate networks in the neighborhood and, building on time series cross sectional data analysis, explains the cross country differences. the study contributes to europeanization and network governance literatures by demonstrating that the main driver of eu engagement in climate networks in the region is interdependencies stemming from geographic proximity. meanwhile, state capacity is an important condition for establishing climate cooperation: climate cooperation develops more with closer neighbors that have stronger state capacity. importantly, contrary to the logic of its international climate commitments, climate vulnerabilities do not define the extent of the eu's engagement in climate networks with its neighborhood. 10. title: understanding bureaucratic support for coerced institutional change authors: thomas myksvoll, micha�l tatham, anne lise fimreite abstract: institutional reform processes can be contested. the more so by those working in the affected institutions. bureaucracies, in particular, can be resistant to change. to better understand such processes, we study the regional reform in norway. this reform is interesting as it mixes "voluntary" and "forced" dynamics. indeed, norwegian regions (fylkeskommuner) can remain unchanged, merge voluntarily, or be forced to merge by central government. this provides an opportunity to better understand support for coerced change. through a survey of regional bureaucrats, we test different explanations of support for forced mergers. we find that two logics are at play. a "logic of discipline" which appeals to right wing bureaucrats, advocates larger units, and streamlined bureaucracies, even if this is against the wishes of the main actors involved. and an "identity logic" which recognizes that feelings of attachment are powerful shapers of preferences beyond what efficiency and functionality dictate. 11. title: the extra legal governance of corruption: tracing the organization of corruption in public procurement authors: mih�ly fazekas, salvatore sberna, alberto vannucci abstract: this article traces the organization of corruption in public procurement, by theoretically and empirically assessing the contribution of extra legal governance organizations (ego) to supporting it. theoretically, we explore the governance role played by organized criminal groups in corruption networks, facilitating corrupt transactions by lowering search costs, bargaining costs, and enforcement cots. empirically, the analysis exploits a rare empirical setup of proven cases of both ego presence and absence in contract awards by italian municipalities. we use traditional regression and supervised machine learning methods for identifying and validating proxy indicators for ego presence in public procurement such as single bidding or municipal spending concentration. internal validity of our models is very high, 85% of unseen contracts are correctly classified. external validity is moderate, our predicted ego presence score correlates with established indicators of organized criminality across the whole of italy and europe with a linear correlation coefficient of about 0.4. 12. title: corruption victimization and anti incumbent voting authors: aim�e bourassa, rebecca weitz-shapiro, matthew s. winters abstract: do citizens punish elected politicians for corruption carried out by unelected bureaucrats? most studies of corruption punishment focus on accusations against politicians. we argue that the direct, and therefore undeniable, experience of corruption at the hands of street level bureaucrats will lead citizens to punish national incumbents. we explore whethe the strength of this relationship, nor do we find evidence of systematic r this punishment of corruption is mitigated in circumstances where voters believe that politicians have less control over bureaucrats. we combine cross national survey data on corruption victimization and political behavior in a sample of 60 countries from africa and latin america. we find a robust, negative effect of personal corruption victimization on vote intention. surprisingly, we do not identify any significant country level predictors of differences in how copartisans respond to bureaucratic corruption relative to noncopartisans. our paper contributes to the growing literature on how interaction with street level bureaucrats drives political behavior. 13. title: divided loyalties? the role of national io staff in aid funded procurement authors: mirko heinzel abstract: many operational international organizations (ios) rely on national staff when implementing projects in member states. however, fears persist that the loyalties of national io staff may be divided when working in their home countries. the article studies differences in more than 50,000 procurement decisions taken in 1729 projects overseen by world bank staff working as expatriates or in their home countries. the empirical results show that when staff work in their home countries, national suppliers' probability of winning procurement contracts increases. however, these increases are not driven by restricted procurement processes�that exclude competition�which are often seen as red flags for corruption. instead, restricted procurement processes seem to be less likely when staff work in their home countries. these findings imply that national io staff use their country &) ,-./8{��̻�̬̬��zreue5h)'�h_3v5�ojqj^jajh)'�hu<�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h�ud5�ojqj^jajh�ud5�ojqj^jo(h�"�h�"�o(&h�"�h�"�5�cjojqj^jajo(h�n�5�cjojqj^jajh 2e5�cjojqj^jajh_3v5�cjojqj^jaj h��5�cjojqj^jajo(#h�"�h�"�5�cjojqj^jajh_3v5�cjojqj^jaj#h_3vh_3v5�cjojqj^jaj,-.|�� - 78��/0��n��gd�psgd)w�gd�q�gd$?�gdto�gd�l$gd%j,gdu<�gd�"�$a$gdt4{|�� , 6 7 m�67��ͽ�ߠ��r�r�r�rc�w�hh)'�hu<�ojqj^jajh�-bojqj^jajh)'�h�l$ojqj^jajh)'�h�l$5�ojqj^jajh)'�ht4ojqj^jajh)'�h_3vojqj^jajh)'�hj�ojqj^jajh)'�ht45�ojqj^jajh)'�h_3v5�ojqj^jajh)'�hicy5�ojqj^jajh)'�hu<�5�ojqj^jajh)'�hj�5�ojqj^jaj789:;b��./013:��\��߰߰��rbrbrsdh)'�h�q�ojqj^jajh)'�h$?�ojqj^jajh)'�h�q�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h$?�5�ojqj^jajh)'�hs/�5�ojqj^jajh)'�hanojqj^jajh)'�h_3vojqj^jajh)'�h_3v5�ojqj^jajh)'�hto�ojqj^jajh)'�h�`�5�ojqj^jajh)'�hto�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h%j,5�ojqj^jaj\�mqv��,l��bdhj��ⱡ��o��`�p�p�p�p�p�`�h)'�h�q�ojqj^jajo(h)'�h)w�ojqj^jaj"h)'�h�q�5�ojqj^jajo(h)'�h�q�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h�ps5�ojqj^jajh)'�h)w�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h%j,ojqj^jaj h;h�q�cjojqj^jaj h;h;cjojqj^jajh)'�h�q�ojqj^jajh)'�h;ojqj^jaj��$�$%(%�(�(e)})�-�-�.�.�5�5�56;;�<4=�d�d��gd�s�gd�_gdlz�gd�)ggd|�gdr7agd)w�!(��.#0#�$�$�$�$�$�$%%'%1%2%�(�(�(�(�(�(d)n)|)�)�)�-�-�-�-�-��߰��߁߁ρ�߰��q�q�q�߰��a�h)'�hr5�ojqj^jajh)'�h�)g5�ojqj^jajh)'�h|�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h�q�ojqj^jajo(h)'�h�q�ojqj^jajh)'�h)w�ojqj^jajh)'�hvi�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h�q�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h)w�5�ojqj^jajh)'�hr7a5�ojqj^jaj&�-�-6.8.�.�.�.�.�.�/�/11�1�1�1�1r2t2�5�5�5�5�5�5�5�56(6)6�9�9;;;;;!;��߽��o�o߽��_�_h)'�h�s�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h�_5�ojqj^jajh)'�hr5�ojqj^jajh)'�h�q�ojqj^jajo(h)'�h�q�ojqj^jajh)'�h)w�ojqj^jajh)'�h)w�5�ojqj^jaj"h)'�h�q�5�ojqj^jajo(h)'�h�q�5�ojqj^jajh)'�hlz�5�ojqj^jaj%!;<<�<�<�<2=f=h=d>f>bb�d�d�d�d�d�dff"f4f6f�f�f�f�h�hjlknkxmzm�m�n�nto��ͽﭞ��ͭ��ͽﭞ��p`p`p��h)'�h)'�ojqj^jajo(h)'�h)'�ojqj^jajh)'�h�q�ojqj^jajo(h)'�h�q�ojqj^jajh)'�h)w�ojqj^jajh)'�h)w�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h[5�ojqj^jajh)'�h�s�5�ojqj^jaj"h)'�h�q�5�ojqj^jajo(h)'�h�q�5�ojqj^jaj%�d$f�fvoxopp�j�j�kl u"u`v�v��:��8�h�j��gd�e�gd�7agd �gdmw�gd�q�gd)w�gd�s�tovoxo\o`ono�o�opppp"p#ptjj�j�j�j�j�j�jk��ѱ��ѱ��~n��^�n>h)'�hmw�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h�s�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h�s�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h�q�ojqj^jajo(uh)'�h�q�ojqj^jajh)'�h)w�5�ojqj^jaj"h��h�q�5�ojqj^jajo(h��h�q�5�ojqj^jajh��h)w�5�ojqj^jajh��h�s�5�ojqj^jajh��h�~�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h)w�ojqj^jaj specific knowledge to increase the development effectiveness of procurement in line with the mandate of the world bank. 14.title: multilevel political connections and nonprofit revenues under authoritarianism: evidence from chinese foundations authors: qun wang abstract: under authoritarianism, nonprofits establish formal political connections at the organizational level when they are affiliated with the state or at the individual level when they have government officials assume managerial positions. from the perspective of multilevel interorganizational relations, this article uses a sample of chinese foundations to investigate the association of the two levels of political connections and their interactions with a wide range of nonprofit revenues. the results report no positive relationship between individual political connections and nonprofit revenues and quite limited evidence that above relationship is positively moderated by organizational political connections. at the organizational level, politically connected foundations may receive more government grants and domestic and overseas donations than civic foundations, depending on which type of agencies they are affiliated with government or quasi government. the results imply authoritarian states may shift toward institutionalized measures to manage nonprofits and reduce the involvement of government officials to ensure policy consolidation. 15. title: willingness to pay taxes through mutual trust: the effect of fairness, governability, tax enforcement and outsourcing on local tax collection rates authors: itai beeri, akab zaidan, rami zeedan abstract: this study extends our understanding about the interrelationship between taxation policy, democracy and financial performance in local governments. every government, particularly local ones, would like to make their residents more willing to pay taxes. based on the trend of making local authorities less reliant on national budgets and the ever increasing expectations that they provide high quality services, we investigated how public perceptions about the local government's fairness, tax enforcement, governability and the outsourcing of local tax collection affect the percentage of local property taxes collected. we used a survey of 607 israeli residents randomly sampled from municipalities that do and do not outsource, and independent data about tax collection rates. the results indicate that perceptions about tax enforcement and governability mediate the relationship between perceptions about fairness and tax collection rates. however, only within local authorities that outsourced tax collection was there a positive relationship between perceptions about tax enforcement and tax collection rates and a positive relationship between perceptions about governability and tax collection rates. implications of the findings are discussed in the era of local democracy and local governance. �nn/ffnċ� 16. title: property threats and the politics of anti statism. the historical roots of contemporary tax systems in latin america authors: jorge atria abstract: the article reviews the book property threats and the politics of anti-statism: the historical roots of contemporary tax systems in latin america by gabriel ondetti. 17. title: the pursuit of governance; nordic dispatches on a new middle way authors: mahmoud javadi abstract: the article reviews the book the pursuit of governance; nordic dispatches on a new middle way by fabrizio tassinari. 18. title: the popular foundations of the modern state and democracy: democracy by petition: popular politics in transformation, 1790 1870. authors: david delfs erbo andersen abstract: the article reviews the book democracy by petition: popular politics in transformation, 1790 1870 by daniel carpenter. 19. title: precolonial legacies in postcolonial politics: representation and redistribution in decentralized west africa authors: noah l. nathan abstract: the article reviews the book precolonial legacies in postcolonial politics: representation and redistribution in decentralized west africa by martha wilfahrt. 20. title: who matters at the world bank? bureaucrats, policy change, and public sector governance authors: matt andrews abstract: the article reviews the book who matters at the world bank?: bureaucrats, policy change, and public sector governance by kim moloney. k�k�kl"l$l�s�su u"u&u(u*u8u�u�u^vrv�v�v�v�v�y�y��ϑςr�`�r�r��p��h)'�h�q�ojqj^jajo("h��h�q�5�ojqj^jajo(h)'�h �5�ojqj^jajh)'�h �ojqj^jajh)'�h�s�5�ojqj^jajh% zh�q�ojqj^jajo(h)'�h�q�ojqj^jajh)'�h)w�ojqj^jajh)'�h)w�5�ojqj^jajh)'�hmw�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h�q�5�ojqj^jaj�� &�x�z�� :�l�n��6�8�j�f�h�z�|�h�j�l�p��óߡ߳�߳�ђ�ó߳r�r��ђ��brh)'�h>z�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h�e=5�ojqj^jajh)'�h�7a5�ojqj^jajh)'�h)w�ojqj^jajh)'�hjmi5�ojqj^jaj"h��h�e�5�ojqj^jajo(h)'�h)w�5�ojqj^jajh#j�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h�e�ojqj^jajh)'�h�e�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h)w�ojqj^jajo( j�l��ʆї҇ĉ�j�l��>�b�f�h�l�n�r�t�x�z�|�~��gd�gd�^�gd�e=gd)w��ȇކ��·ї҇և�ĉֈ��@�d��&�(�h��й��w��e��v?�?��-h)'�h�^�b*ojqj^jajmh phsh h)'�h�^�ojqj^jaj"h)'�h�e=5�ojqj\�^jajh#j�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h�e=ojqj^jajh)'�h>z�ojqj^jaj-h)'�h>z�b*ojqj^jajmh phsh -h)'�hvfb*ojqj^jajmh phsh h)'�hvfojqj^jajh)'�h>z�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h�e=5�ojqj^jajh�j�l�p�b��$�<�r��>�f�h�`�b�d�h�j�n�p�t�v�|�~��񭖭��xplplplplxh�l�jh�l�uh)'�hj<ojqj^jajh)'�h>z�ojqj^jaj-h)'�h>z�b*ojqj^jajmh phsh -h)'�h�^�b*ojqj^jajmh phsh h)'�h>z�5�ojqj^jajh#j�5�ojqj^jajh)'�h�e=5�ojqj^jajh)'�h�^�ojqj^jaj01�82p��. ��a!�"�#��$��%��s��i��[�cs2�� 0@p`p��2(�� 0@p`p�� 0@p`p�� 0@p`p�� 0@p`p�� 0@p`p�� 0@p`p��8x�v~�� 0@�� 0@�� 0@�� 0@�� 0@�� 0@�� 0@�� 0@�� 0@�� 0@�� 0@�� 0@�� 0@�� 0@pj_hmh nhsh thj`��jck�e$1$a$ cjkh_hajmh nhsh th$a ��$؞��k=�w[sobi��bnf�h�&��ŝ�]�6��ҩ��n=��in��a7��qb&>!"�h [�� lx�z)��w�v�og�%�ţ|8mă#�/��8��'��=��q�u*��c�`c�w{�d6��/�[��yl��%�� n� {�\�o�sm�/�~��i�bcax��/=xe��'5��&\�h�4da��,ye\}�)�l�a��r�^��*�z��y�v-wowz�n�]��:m�v�=t�c��w��r�b��*i�v�u�r��u��|�nc`�|��*^��pk! ѐ��'theme/theme/_rels/thememanager.xml.rels��m �0��wooӻ�&݈э��5 6?$q�� ,.�a��i��c2�1h�:�q��m��@rn��;d�`��o7�g�k(m&$r(.1�r'j��њt��8��v�"��aȼ�h�u}��|�$�b{��p��8�g/]�qasم(��#��l�[��pk-!��[content_types].xmlpk-!�֧��60_rels/.relspk-!ky��theme/theme/thememanager.xmlpk-!��f��theme/theme/theme1.xmlpk-! ѐ��'� theme/theme/_rels/thememanager.xml.relspk]� j�� {7\�-!;tok��h�~�*,-.0124ghjk�dj�~� /3i�@� @��h ��0�( � ��0�( � ��b �s�� ?��',�� jp��$�� qx""q"z"�"�"�#�#�#�#�#�#%$&$�&�&�&�& ''''}(�(�)�)& ' � � � � � � � � x,y, .,.6070q0v0i0n0�1�1�1�1�2�2�3�34%4u4c4�4�4$5%5a5f5g5n5�8�8�9�9�:�:�=�=�>�>???? ?????%?�@�@hdmd�d�d�d7e>e�e�e�e�eifqfrf{fgg�h�h�i�i�i�i�i�i�ijjjj�i�i�ij3hd�d�d�d�i�i�i�i�ijjjj66��7 7 \ � mqv�0�0�1�1c2d244�4�4�4�4y5y5b9b9e9e9j9j9 =@=�=�=�=�=gdgdqdrd�e�e~f�f�g�g�h�h�ij��q04e��n[gbx�:�v],-�o��`<|��o";0ri1�%�rrsui��w�i�={u�,� uz*�m� �r=��-9h�s��eme�.~�� {r�v�4�1l2q �"�iaha��og>�u��`�1_��%v��nh{��q��u�3�d]-�z:kkkkn;�q0�<�?*�7��:a��^b� �l{��2h�(�#!�q��m4-cqrrs�4>gv�p]�sao-�?��yn�b~i�(��)ib��>!]�.�` rv:g&>!��}n!�l��2�"�0r��\�|�@@md-%;�blrbr]�a 6ji� ��vj�`�[jo 5j90�ry �:[� k 3q-r�q l jx 8i� tp� k�|�2~� ��y��k� ?i�� *�?=��#?sq�?*�@�4le�dw" ��z�g�kd�2�^e�-h�x�w��t�bs &�x�-z�y��w�i�>�:-��u kkkkdw" q�x�-h� k^r� �^�vxb� �=#�/y�pur �� 'ff�x-z�d�y�(��)fk{z��fv��-�p�'�e��4�!~q�2h`�?i��be��@��fk-<"��l�q�u��y/�x{��]^�~76=&��` [� ��rh&<�^��oc!��d{�/�"��q��[��h�2��d��t��w�8i� (f�tl(��}�t�a9�~�8��7l��4�>��ou ";�g)n��p7v}g�xd|��&�h�w�a�k��r�dg�b�u�d\*�)#jb�l�d� )r�}��w�gl$l��r�qh� v��/xcz.�^m~;�|p%�fzps7l�ps�#��<>)��s��vj��h5h 5� a�l[�x� xcz�be�yfdxl�y��raj>�n�cr%v��h�a9�� !`��q�}<�q�}q =�7y]{dzs�_��r�-��.��zf�7�� e�o[kh,~�hmpm~�mg�=�j��>m�?[%��'w�jo8�l�y2\gqwez ��p]74�`a��m�!�|z��z:�*��b!�g;cq�qq�h�nk^r a�x�t an�gap�y8��x��s��d��z��j�vzq��t\ ~��av'po�_m4�i�w��tkpb�` r@^��q1��yn�pur �p}��ou �� urep�&>!�z[fxx)!�b!x{�ec!�t�k��oc!�v�>b(p!� ]!�3�l��!nr�q�m�!�j#�g-�!�f�d�[z"�u&z�6'�"�zy�q �"ji�_��m�"� ]!�&�"�)��/�"|z�s\�"=v�g��~#�)9~��k#�� i3#�#?�=#�i\;�j#p%�sh�#��2k�#�|�#ry �ps�#pb��9�#�sa�d $��yj!4$�`�%�qg$�ep$�"e<@v�$:*�$�[��p�$�]'��?[>�?z]%�`�%vd�i1�%�lyk-,�%�,�=��l�%�z�@� �%-4�q�x�%�!0��e&poq�bs &�b*&t�(6=&�'w�rh&2\�qp&nyvc��t�&��&�]'�ep$�tw�'~d:(�r�'�kl��>�'��5�l�'�taz��w(r�@�~d:(�_(it~tl(�x�,�dm�(�t�(�pi�(��]�a#�(�j�`�<>)^e��w)!,�f��)�l�%��)mq{�"*�^�i��le*^l�x�ne*n9��^�*�:8t��[? �v ��o�(s� qh� �`� q�f�� {p��c,@�i��#,�dq[mk, @p�qb,�d&dizy,�qd?��,�>m��x�,�{u�,�@�q>,-�m4-rt�h�fk-�r�-�j�n�2@�-�ggc��-x*�y��->o.-dt��t�.��z]�.�x��<}7/d|��y/ds}��/: o=tj�/0�u0{z�o�!0�ran 0gy|�5j90�$�}�;1�0��efw2 �z��>2"o�m�29!"e�w�2�f\�h�2n�~�f3�w�3ui�� h�3 �3dj�u�3��xksj4��9@�4�;�4�d5��p�4@l�5h 5�^b^� -a5�pv5�d5tw�'��5��5md-�b�5i�d��v�5 -a5�r 6@@�a 6�`d�#6ghch�81�6�&7��6�a�r!�6q1��@�6xx�6)1:t�&7�x�\�~74\�7bd9t=r�7��gr f8c�]��jo8�~�8��8��b�n9?oi��9ac�9 h�3�q�9�a:�kx_�s�:kkkk�3�:�!�q�o";�4mjjo;�i\;�%�|c;�q��viu;�ru�;�~7�[u�u�`fr>�>�'i�>r]��v�>lrb�qd?�mt?<#iq!{�?p[5=�tf�?�t�&�?�*��o-�?�mt?�s�? u|3e�?�-x{�8�?�@}��*.}@��)��-�@�t�`�r�@g��z�@z]%hag;��:a�s6ay8��doahu�(�a�le*�&e�ana��.�an��a�$,&d]�l�d|1�q�i�dbl#g�>e�\��ez�v�n�e�v ��'�e�#�c�hfs�]�=bdf�^^n��z[f�y��f�"�o w~g� l`�#�g�{9=��g�8�g=v�g�o�t�{s h�-h�pv5p@h�og�ghch'\l��&�h�t�e�hoaq�!~q��y#%�q@gku�nr�q�q��qqg$-4�q�r)b;r�,�q��0hr�l��zwr� {r;1�0��y{r�i�r�� (u�r�$atxcs�#sw/�=fzps8ts)b;r��ts�#�g3%�s�{�s�;�4��g/t�4>�:8t�gn�bd9t�utt�4�z]z[t� �m��td $�`�t�s��2u�,!u�rdi�@gku�u0 g�u��uxcs>�uc;�r�^v��exyyv�d�^�v4�o�v�j$w�w�w�6�x�m�2:3�x�q�y��x�3�:��o�x�#s^l�x\<�jg�xq>,- q�x�}<��x_/,j�zy��t��`-y<myv��q�yv^mc��y<z�&xfk{z�kd �zhp��[�enx�:[�=�^�` [�0�[(>y��f\�?\i�(��\�m��x�\~�f<1/�\�s��d]�7y]�>aqs�]��c�]hv�i��]viu;�]^ph$^�^b^�`.�^�=�^�1_�kx_�a9�zs�_k�ji�_l{��`�2u� !`�qb,�� l`�y`� ��t�`�=�}�j�`�qq��u�`�>�`_m�t a��&na[mk,�9a��q��a��5��>�asq�y�3j�a�zwr�a�t�3b@�z��)ib�u~b1�h��u�b�~#�%;�b@v�$03cd.�b�ggcg-�!�va�c�^��c(�a�u�c�0hr��#�c�j$wvd0q|�`d�d&d�@�m�r�d.sp�f�d,-�zn�d�|�#�9!"e2k�#�g e�/e� *^ee��l\e�>e��eme�hgqwe�u �t�edu�efd��ek'�e�&fji�,\f<}7/��zfs{tq�f3%�s!,�fqx{zm�f�5�k~�fxx�6�a�f6�f<z�bl#g�^blkqg�j9r��g8|k=�p�g�z�gdh�-9h�k?oi�u�<mebi�rdi�b*&��b~i�y{r4�i�`-y�^�ix�u�nf�i�~7djtj�/v,�j�8�?w�j�`�t�=�j�4�q\<�j�dk�g�tkzl!{�?�klv:g��3�l<|�<ie�lj l�^(m��k��.�mz*�ma�� m�hn�y`�gn��!�g)nfr>��^^nv��,mn�kj>�n6�nsq�h#�n�gv'po� ��"�o�"�o6gp�e�oh��.�o�r��v�omg��o]z[thptf�?(ap(s� @p�[? bep=r�7�c�p�qp&��dq�vzq� �<#iq�!�q� ��qq =��,�q�w�#!�q{s h�4�q�a�f�l�q|1�q6s�~r�q3q-rie�l��j9r �3�c;�rn[g� �r�-�@�y0�sb(p!��s{fm-dt�y�)1:to �v�$at�6�x� 0w?0w?0w?0w?�.�t�/e��t(ap�}�t�o�t�u2�&xph$^�enx[�x,mnf�x&xn �x�0�<�=.y6�f�� oyrgox*�y�x�u��yd]-sq�y7��yxl�y�t�.��y];yw��y�w��u&z�*n{��tazr=��whkzjx �.tzji��z�4�z@�z�.�o��z�`�o��%�z�q�wv{�nh{$,&d�*n{�s�?mq{ hr{��6�jbs{�-x{qx{�@�6m�{�d��0q|�~�vgy|��s� u|�[|�w)�\�| w~g;�|�g ek�|�.�t�y>�|b�5�ds}xyyv�p}�r>�$�}dm�(�m�}j<�v��=�}jbs{�q�}\ ~�=�h,~03c��)9~whkzit~�;�~j{�~0�n�n�~l�.sps{t�<(>y\*�4e�z �j�{p�4\�7��(k�i��x��m�j��[mw�;3`2 r � �p j^�n�.�_ati�wbl��.h j<sh�to>s�r#�l$�}&�m'�m(�)%j,�p.�i/�2�z2'4t4.6�6*8;i8cj8�9�<�e=k&>e!@jj@r7a�ec�nd�udvf0i4tj�kul%man�wn�%smkxgy�py�^ro_5a�7a�-bhc 2e�lf�qf�)gjmi�ckalthllmnnm}on[r�ps0@ui1v_3vywm8xicy% z�x}�/�wt�mw��=��=��`�j�nj��9�l�.~�v�=h��j��~�du�� =i�fj�to�4��m��z��2�)w��l�lz��c�7��e�u<�[��t��r��4��^�v��\�a�vi�|w�r��)'�$?��?�� !�s/�#j��8�*��-��_�$-��f��q�><��r��c�>z�7"��s�?5��"�gl�bj�h��-�� "��s�w�p��n�2��y��e�`-�|��i�i�@��0��!�"�#�$�(�)& &,&- . /606162636465�8j�@��4@��<@�"�h@�.�0�2�h@�8�t@�<�>��@�b��@�f�h�j�l�n��@�j��unknown��g��.�[x� �times new roman5��symbol3.��.�[x� �arial;��(�[sosimsuna��$b�cambria math 1��h;"�f�b�g�� >%� �>%��-!),.:;?]}�� & 6"0000 00 00000�� =�@�\�]�^��([{� 0 000000��;�[��i�i 2�q��hp��?��"�2!xx��v��user windows (u7bhdj ��i ��z'��`��i��z'�� oh�� '��0`�� ( 4@hpx�usernormal.dotmwindows �û�166microsoft office word@�^�:@�y��\�@�� >�� ՜.�� ,��0� x`t|��microsoft�%�i !"#$%&'()* ,-./0123456789:;<=>?@abcdefghijkl��nopqrst��vwxyz[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~��root entry�� f��data ��m1table��ufyworddocument��2�summaryinformation(��documentsummaryinformation8��compobj��n�� fmicrosoft word 97-2003 �ĵ� msworddocword.document.8�9�q